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NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

The Outcome of the Southern Race Question.—The negro has not proven, after forty years of trial, a merely belated white man; he has less self-control, is less affected by ultimate advantages, and is less controlled by family ties and standards of personal morality than the average white person, immigrant or native, with the poorest chance, the least educated and civilized. Another thing counting against the negro is race prejudice. In the South it is very strong. For the race difficulty here, six main remedies have been proposed.

1. *Fusion.*—This is urged by few, but is recognized as having happened to most races dwelling together, and is now, in some degree, in process in the South. Southern whites will not welcome it without a great change in attitude, and having one part of the country occupied by a race of mixed color would only complicate the problem by making it national.

2. *Race separation.*—Transportation fails because of the financial difficulty, the sentimental opposition, and the demand for labor. Replacement by northern and foreign immigration has been unsuccessful because of general dislike for agricultural and rural life. Living in separate communities and race segregation are impossible because of close economic interdependence of the races.

3. *Legislation.*—Enactments against negro idleness, laziness, in favor of prohibition and mounted police have been proposed, but meet with the objection that they affect whites also. Besides, legislation does not necessarily raise the character of either racial element and does little to lessen race hostility.

4. *Violence.*—Terrorization is the remedy most widely advocated and applied. Besides shooting, maiming, etc., lynching is a common and well-known method. Much of the evil might be mitigated by the establishment of special courts for aggravated crimes, faithful duty by officials, and quick trial and sure punishment. Negroes should also assist in turning over offenders of their race to justice.

5. *Vassalage.*—Working conditions are much more formal in the South, the negro being valued, not for what he can produce, but for the profit he brings his landlord or employer. This tends toward a condition of peasant labor. More than half the southern negroes are close to the condition of hereditary laborers. Their dependence upon patrons lead them into peonage, which varies from the negative obligation of other employers to not hire a negro in debt to another man to virtual sale of the man's services under the operation of iniquitous lower courts. The worst effect, besides its economic demoralization, is that it discourages and enrages the negroes and brutalizes the whites.

6. *Uplift.*—External constraint is irritating; regeneration of the race must proceed from within. But can the negro come up to the white man's standard and would he be permitted to do so? He has accumulated \$500,000,000 of property, one-fortieth of the South's holdings, and has made good in many skilled trades, has acquired land, and has developed some qualities of leadership. His schools lack efficiency largely from want of white teachers, but much good elementary and industrial training is given. Many white writers and leaders oppose negro education and advancement as an encroachment upon the whites, but more see here the best interests of both.—Albert Bushnell Hart, *North American Review*, July, 1908.

L. L. B.

Enlightened Action the True Basis of Morality.—Morality is a matter of actual conduct or life. Ethics arises as a criticism of standardized action, and seems always present. The true basis of morality is enlightened action. Action for its own sake, without understanding, is not moral, any more than mere enlightenment alone is. Yet, individuals in society cannot be classified, as to their morality, according to their understanding and their action. The heroic

morality arising out of the one attitude and the commonplace morality springing from the other are in everyone, according as habit or ideal is emphasized in consciousness. Ultimately the ideal appears from the commonplace for a new basis of action. Thus true morality is wrapped up in conflict, in the reforming of the characters of people on the basis of more knowledge. Consequently, to be moral is to break the formal law when it conflicts with the higher law of development. "The heroic never has been and never will be a respecter of persons." But no life is so enlightened that it can anticipate all events. Here therefore enters a chance element in experience, the outcome of which must be imagined or taken for better or for worse. It is here that religion finds its connection with morality.—A. H. Lloyd, *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1908.

L. L. B.

[Social Cost of Accident, Ignorance, and Exhaustion.]—The establishment of factories means an industrial revolution from which the child will suffer, unless protected by law. It is an established fact that the delinquent, dependent, neglected child is physically and intellectually inferior, on the average, to the normal school child. This leads us back to the influences which affect the development of the very poor child before birth and in the years of infancy. In this respect our past history has been one chiefly of neglect, the result of a *laissez-faire* philosophy. Insufficient nutrition and excessive toil of factory girls and mothers have for their results either the death of the embryo, or premature birth, and resulting constitutional feebleness of the child. Poor factory women must have sickness insurance if they are to be forced to relinquish work during pregnancy and after confinement. The school, from the sixth to fourteenth years, should be a means for physical and industrial training of the child rather than for its exhaustion. Training should be under medical supervision. Playgrounds, scientifically directed, must also play a part.

Conditions and dangers of child labor are not yet adequately known, but it is certain that the greater physiological awkwardness and inexperience of the child makes him liable to more accidents, while women and children are more susceptible to occupational diseases.

It is estimated that the economic value to society of a healthy normal child of fifteen is \$15,000. Besides this, is the social value, more important and dependent on a multitude of healthy, intelligent, moral, and eager youths.

Not death, but feebleness, degeneration, pauperism, and crime, as results of a bad industrial system, are the greatest burdens upon society. In his early years society spends much in time, energy, and money upon the child, while the mother contributes more than any other one interested. Society and the mothers have a right to expect returns. The chief cause of this loss through premature labor is ignorance of its results, and of what others have done to remove the evil.—C. R. Henderson, *Annals of the American Academy*, July, 1908.

L. L. B.

The Rebellion of Woman.—"Today woman is in rebellion, and her rebellion is the fact of the age." She has always been in rebellion against repression and restriction, but this generation will probably see the culmination of the revolt. Proverb and aphorism have crystallized man's conception of woman, and they have revealed his fear of her unrest and his knowledge of her discontent. She has regarded the home more as a prison than as a shelter, and has needed only contact with the world to bring her to discontent. Man has used all possible means, from bribery and cajolery to punishment, to restrain her. In the East the movement is largely for education. In the West it is for political and economic rights. A special demand is that for equal pay for equal work. The struggle for political rights is as a means to social and industrial recognition. The gravest form of her revolt is that against unwilling and too-frequent motherhood, as the decreasing birth rate shows. She demands the right to determine whether she will be a mother and when, on the ground that only consciously desired motherhood is fair to mother and child and that a few children well and willingly borne would be of greater national value than "a numerous and unwanted progeny."

Woman demands reform and freedom because of her humanhood; they are denied her because she is alleged incapable of using her freedom wisely. That woman is not incapable is shown by the strength of her present fight, and by the fact that children are equal heritors from mother and father. Not so many women are content with present conditions as is sometimes alleged by the opponents of the movement. They lack freedom of expression and have not the technique for rebellion. Even today women are discriminated against before the law and industrially, while they are largely subjected to the license of men.

The whole race suffers from this subjection of one sex to another, and family life is but a mockery of what it might be. The women are not fighting alone, but many men, forgetting their maleness, are helping. "Those who are afraid of the great dangers now in the making, point to the extremists who exist among us. They see the acknowledged man-hater, and they profess to be afraid of a sex-war. They see those who, taking license and refusing responsibility, yet seek to retain the privileges by which woman's subject lot was gilded in the past. These latter women—and they are few—are not the conscious thinking rebels whose claims are based upon principle. They are the unconscious instruments of recoil; they are the product of the very conditions the thinking rebel is striving to abolish." The great problems of sex are at the heart of life. Knitted with them are the problems of race, of morality, of health, of economics. Everywhere the one-sexed solution has produced evil and abnormality. Humanity is dual, and there must be a dual solution. Triumph means a new world.—Tresa Billington-Greig, *Contemporary Review*, July, 1908.
L. L. B.

[Women and the Franchise.]—The woman's movement, as an expression of the growing sentiment of sex solidarity, is recent. All previous movements were sporadic and non-symptomatic. Greek and Roman philosophers argued equality of the sexes; the moderns have generally opposed it. Subjection cannot be the sole cause of the mental unproductiveness and the political barrenness of women. Until recently the discussion has been quite academic and there has been no general movement on the part of the women themselves to support the claims of individuals. If women are to be allowed the suffrage their legal qualifications must be determined, and these will probably differ from those for men. The question of national expediency will also be raised. Here the result of doubling the suffrage by the addition of the women would necessitate a complete governmental reorganization and damage the credit and power of the national government. Law, from the earliest times in England, has not excluded women from the occupations open to men, but custom and the desire of woman herself have been the great factors. Spencer, commenting on Mill, has remarked that there is also abundance of material for an essay on "the subjection of men." Women are beginning at the wrong end in demanding suffrage before they are willing to assume other political and social responsibilities. Admission of women to vote would probably lead to greater indifference in the choosing of representatives and consequently to the lowering of the dignity and responsibility of legislative bodies. Secondary and extrinsic motives would enter into voting. Already women political organizations have been marked by wirepulling and shameless adulation of rank and money in a conspicuous degree. In the present stage of the movement, it would probably be much better for "female suffragists" to demand the enfranchisement of spinsters and widows only. The putting of all women and all men on the same footing, despite Mill and other theorists, is practically absurd in the highest degree. Men did not get the franchise, all at once. The principle that "taxation and representation go together" has never held in practice. Talk about rights, taxation, tyranny, etc., will count for little with sensible people. It is a question of practicability. The amount of experience in matters and interests of the world of the people enfranchised must also be considered. Mrs. Frederick Harrison contends that women are not a separate class, that they are now citizens, that the interests of the sexes are not antagonistic. She says that for the most part the sexes are endowed in different measure with physical,

moral, and mental characteristics and that this question of suffrage must be settled from the normal or typical woman's standpoint, rather than from that of the Joan of Arc. Although the "suffragettes" evidently take themselves seriously, as shown by their demonstrations, there is evidence that the attention they call to themselves among women will defeat their ends. A very strong objection to the movement is the increased power it would give, if successful, to the Roman Catholic priesthood.—*Edinburgh Review*, July, 1908.

Psychological Factors in Social Transmission.—The comparative psychologist and the ethnologist have recently opened up to us large fields of information regarding organic and social heredity. The historical method has in our day had a completer triumph than that of the physical sciences, but not all social processes can be explained by it alone. The historical series is not a stream but a succession. Yet the possibilities of social variation are not exhausted, despite the fact that great men come in groups. This may even be a hopeful sign. The sociology of mere historical succession is based upon the assumption that man is exclusively a rational creature who receives and transmits and lives in accordance with ideas of varying complexity and importance. But, as a matter of fact, this is the smaller element in social life. The really important things are the primal instincts which make all life akin. Survivals in social custom are not really survivals, but are variant activity adjustments under new conditions to old fundamental instincts. Race and individual alike progress from bare instinct to reason. In both, this progress is mediated; and not by imitation wholly. Transmission is due to both heredity and tradition. How these interact in producing a common social result is our problem. The feelings are organically and not socially transmissible; social transmission involves in each individual a complete new series of adjustments in order to make reception possible. It is largely through the living over in imagination the experiences of the past that present unity of action materializes. Thus institutions obtain a strong compelling power, while progress is attained by interpreting all causation in personal terms. Early, in the case of the individual, and at some time in the race history, control is by mates—by association—rather than by superiors. At this stage imitation is the mean for bringing about a social average and in it an average socius. Many people get little, or not at all, beyond this. As a comparative exception there is developed the period or stage of reason, in which control is exerted by and through ideals. But this can be only a small fraction of the force of control in group life at the present time. The main principle is folk and historical selection tempered to the efficiency of the institution and the individual who are complements.—J. W. Slaughter, *The Sociological Review*, April, 1908.

L. L. B.

Civilization in Danger.—"Civilized humanity at the present moment is undergoing profound transformations." Fifty years ago there were well-marked groups and classes. Democratic pressure and material progress are tending to make these disappear. Social leveling is equally apparent from the material, the intellectual, and the moral point of view. The advantages are great. But it also has the danger of resulting in a state of universal mediocrity, which would be the ruin of our civilization.

Outwardly at least, man has become impersonal. All classes dress practically alike, have similar furniture, and a common interest in all amusements. Education is no longer a mark of superiority, and specialization has taken its place as a struggle factor. Culture, as giving men an all-round acquaintance with life, is disappearing. In its place, common ideas and ideals are taken from the daily press. In morality, the men of today are deliberately living in the present. There are no ideals beyond success of the moment, immediate and tangible satisfactions, which can be bought with money. Hence money is the end of action. Higher ideals of intelligence and art are swallowed up in those purely and immediately utilitarian. Morally and intellectually, society is being leveled by the lowering of the *élite* to a uniform level with all the rest. It is self-murder. The consequence is the possible disappearance of every kind of social superiority in which art and culture, which are civilization itself,

will be swallowed up. An age of vulgarity and sordid ugliness is the logical outcome of an age of uniformity.

Such uniformity would be fatal to human happiness, and therefore it must be resisted. Material uniformity is perhaps necessary. But an aristocracy must be preserved, for to suppress inequalities is to revert to lower forms, to become ants and bees. But the new aristocracy must rest on superiority of talent and of character rather than on the privilege of birth or on money. There is already an aristocracy of intellect, but it fails as yet to see the necessity for organization against universal mediocrity. More than mere intellect—culture, represented by artists and women, must be included in this aristocracy. Woman, as the inspiration of the best in man, as the more idealistic in her aspirations and feelings, has a peculiar interest in the maintenance of culture as a means to civilization. When uniformity comes, individual initiative ends. That is, science ends, is unable to give a new dream. The world is old and cramped in spirit. It is well to keep as much spirit and fire, to ward off inanity, as we can.—René-L. Gérard, *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1908.

L. L. B.

The Right to Constrain Men for Their Own Good.—Constraint in the interest of others is the fundamental principle of all government, the corrective to innate selfishness. The right of constraint in the interest of the constrained is a relatively new and unstable principle, but of late there has been an ever-increasing movement to limit the acts of a person or a group, in cases where no external party is concerned; to intervene between a man's intentions and himself; and to become keeper of the conscience to the world in general. There are three degrees of constraint, provisionally, (A) where it clearly seems beneficial; (B) where benefits and disadvantages are about balanced in the long run; (C) where, as applied to various races, it has proved harmful.

Three fallacies must be noted before application to concrete cases: (1) continual confusion is made between ethics of a group and of an individual. What is right for an individual may be wrong for the race as a whole; (2) that our moral sense is an infallible test of right. It is only the basis of action; in its pure form, as absolute principle, it would be Pharisaism raised to an infinite power; (3) the absolute certainty of the accuracy of one's views constitutes in itself a right to interfere with the views of others. This was the basis of the Inquisition.

A. Most cases of the first degree, as the factory acts, acts for shortening hours of labor, abolition of slavery, etc., are for protection against others rather than against self. On the other hand, it is doubtful if there can be found a case in which constraint of the individual from self-injury is certainly beneficial.

B. In the second case: constraint of other peoples in form of government comes mainly from the desire to keep our own governmental organizations intact. Weaker peoples have always been supplanted in the possessions of their lands when in contact with a stronger power, being, in some cases, remunerated easily for their losses because of increased production. The principle, held to by some, that it is best for the land to be possessed by the people who can support the largest population on it, would lead logically to the supplanting of western nations by the Chinese and Japanese. In questions of constraint over the faults and follies of people at home, we should consider (1) the direct immediate benefits for the man; (2) the same for the family; (3) the possible destruction of self-reliance; (4) weakening of character by precluding temptation; (5) growth of deceit and lawlessness; (6) probability of more injurious substitutes; (7) benefits of weeding-out by excess of the worst of the population; (8) difficulty of saying who is to set the standard. Taking the drink question as a concrete case, not prohibition, but enforced openness and condemnation of excessive use, seem the better policy. Practical courses, in this regard, seem to be: (1) to improve the tone and condition of the traffic; (2) to reduce the facilities for getting drink, while not promoting private drinking; (3) to teach bad effects of alcohol; (4) to impose severer penalties for offenses committed when drunk than when sober; (5) to enforce the supply

of clean water in workshops and public places, and to encourage substitutes. However, constraint seems obviously necessary where power of self-control has been lost in connection with drink, drug habits, gambling, sexual vice, etc. In these cases it is a species of insanity, and labor colonies and means for producing habits of continuous and intensive normal activities are needed.

C. Education suffers most from this third type. A wide interest in all things is the best preventive for seeking abnormal excitement in gambling, stimulants, etc. There should be more freedom in development, for teachers, and for schools, the value of growth being greater than the value of mere conformity. Again constraint, as applied to various races, has been blind and harmful, in the large. The conditions of the growth of institutions, and customs, their uses, and the likelihood of the people being able to adapt themselves to others, should be considered before the old are taken away. Generally, the highest characters can be developed and perpetuated by giving freest rein to suffer from mistakes and profit by successes.—W. M. Flinders Petrie, *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1908. L. L. B.

Is the Christian Necessarily a Socialist?—To identify Christianity with Socialism or Collectivism, despite the tendency of many Christians to become Socialists, is confusing in that it either tends to represent Socialism as an ethical principle or to identify Christianity with a particular programme of social or economic reform. (1) Socialism is only one theory of means of attaining a certain end. There are other theories for reaching this end. In this case the ethical basis or principle is the same for each. Where ends sought are different there must, however, be different ethical bases or motives, either within Christian doctrine or without it. (2) That Christianity cannot be identified with any particular plan of social reforms is shown by the fact that its founder had none and also that socialism aims at its establishment by force. Even considering evolutionary Christianity, the recentness of socialism with its disproportionately rapid growth and the small number of Christians who sanction the identity, oppose the confounding of the two.

Some of those who oppose the present order have argued that it is wholly competitive and hence un-Christian and un-socialistic. To these it may be answered: (1) The present system does not appeal merely to self-interest, for there is interest in family and society under it. (2) While it would be better to have secured a distribution of goods according to contribution, which present radical competition now prevents, this would be by no means reached through altruistic motives alone, but rather through the egoistic. (3) It is only an assumption to imagine that the only possible alternative to the existing social order must be socialism. There are schemes of co-partnership, social regulation, co-operation, etc. Not even socialism could remove all competition, i. e., realize itself. (4) A state of society which appeals exclusively to altruistic motives is impossible. Family and community ties cannot be ignored nor can there be incentive without differential enumeration. The localization of the individual in a particular environment is a fact, and his attachments and cues for action grow out of this. (5) Nor would such a type of human nature be desirable. Even Christianity requires us to love our neighbors no better than ourselves, while all experience indicates that altruism is merely the expansion of egoism. (6) Self-regarding impulses do not necessarily involve competition; nor can competition be done away with without serious ethical and economic loss.

Practically, there should be less division according to names, since the economic and ethical aims are the same. To tag oneself with any particular name is to get out of the sphere of expansion and of greatest usefulness. The plan of union in action for social betterment must be broader than any one social programme.—H. Rashdall, *Economic Review*, July, 1908.

L. L. B.

Three New Books by Professor Bawden.—Three new books, about to be published by Professor H. Heath Bawden, will be of interest to many readers of this *Journal*. These books treat respectively of the basal principles of the new

philosophy called *Pragmatism*; the *Principles of Education*; and the *Principles of Aesthetics*.

Professor Bawden believes that in Pragmatism are to be found the elements of a distinctive American philosophy. Four great constructive ideas unite in this most characteristic product of our Anglo-Saxon civilization—democracy, evolution, energy, and scientific method. Democracy is treated as the organic and functional relationship of the various parts of experience; the idea of evolution, rightly understood, as the only sound basis for a theory of social progress; the concept of energy, which is transforming physics, as supplying in "action" the fundamental category of science; and scientific method, in the "instrumental logic," as transforming philosophy. The *Principles of Pragmatism* will take up in succession the following topics: Philosophy, setting forth the meaning of Pragmatism; experience, the subject-matter with which philosophy deals; consciousness, the transforming phase of experience; feeling, the value consciousness; thinking and knowledge, the mediation of values; truth, and the test of validity; reality, with its baffling problems of objectivity, space, time, causation, mind and matter, origin and destiny. To these problems the pragmatic method is applied with results which cannot fail to be of interest to those who try to "think things together."

The *Principles of Education* exhibit the workings of Pragmatism in the field of education. This book is the result of the author's study and teaching of Professor Dewey's educational philosophy for the past eight years. It is divided into three parts. Part I treats of the "Problem of Education," and contains an exposition of the presuppositions of education, a survey of the contributions of science to education, and an analysis of education as process and as content. Part II treats the "Subject-Matter of Education" on the psychological basis of child development. It discusses successively child psychology, infancy, imitation, the play period, the work period, and adolescence. This part of the volume contains a statement of those important sociological and psychological grounds for a radical reconstruction of the elementary curriculum for which Professor Dewey's educational philosophy stands. Part III discusses the "Method of Education" on the logical basis of adult experience. Educational psychology; experience as action, as feeling, as thinking; and the social significance of the school, constitute the topics which are considered. The various phases of "special method" are treated as corollaries of the great fundamental social and psychical laws brought to light in recent biology and psychology.

The *Principles of Aesthetics* shows the application of the pragmatic philosophy in the field of Beauty. Everywhere in modern science the problem is shifting from the nature of reality and the criteria of knowledge to the appreciation of values. Beauty is the value category *par excellence*. Part I, "Beauty," treats of the general nature of value, beauty as value, and beauty as an absolute. Part II, "Art," discusses art and industry and the art impulse. Part III, "Appreciation," sets forth the psychological theory of aesthetic emotion, aesthetic imagery, stimulation and repose, and their exemplification in the psychology of the comic. Part IV, "Criticism," carries this analysis of aesthetic value into the spheres of art and nature, art and science, art and criticism, and art and life.

Biology and Human Progress.—Without disparaging the other sciences, it must be claimed for biology that, since we are living creatures, it is of the first importance for the understanding of our vital problems, for the cultivation of that foresight which we are bound by our contract with the Almighty to practice. As a means of culture, biology is invaluable for the development of that type of mind which is ready to connect series of facts, and so perceive the danger before it is at the door, the advantage before it has passed by.

All our educational problems may be said to center around questions of "nature and nurture;" in other words, heredity and environment. To what extent can we, by our educational methods, affect the character of the individual? To what extent is it legitimate or desirable to do so? Education may be defined as being the provision of the best means for developing the several

characteristics or abilities of the individual to the best personal and social uses. In this sense it includes adequate nourishment on the one hand, adequate stimuli on the other.

Experiments with the ova of sea-urchins have demonstrated that exposure to a temperature a few degrees above or below the normal at the time of impregnation, or a variation in the salinity of the water, resulted in a decided diminution in the size of the larva. Similarly with higher animals; a doe rabbit was permitted to live and give birth to litters of young in an artificial slum in the basement of a house, where air and light were scant, with the result that many were born dead, and others were so weakly as to be scarcely able to live. Afterward the same mother in healthy surroundings bore vigorous offspring. Biology teaches, then, that living organisms are very easily affected in the earliest stages of their existence.

That the slums of our cities could not be destroyed in a few years, if the people of this country really wished it, is impossible to believe. The trouble is, that we either hold property (if it belongs to us or our associates) to be more valuable than life or health (if they belong to others), or else we do not recognize the true causes of the existing evil. In the latter case science and education should help us, in the former we justify revolution.

To the cry that the world's work must be carried on, cities, factories and mills exist, commercial profit made, regardless of consequences, the biologist can have but one answer: Nothing is right which interferes with the normal healthy life of human beings; nothing so interfering is justifiable if preventable.

Progress in human society may come about in two ways, which in actual fact will be combined. It may result from variation of the germ-plasm, that is to say, actual and fundamental change in the make-up of the individuals; or it may result from the acquired characteristics. By the former method selection of the fit has done something. The elimination of the unfit will be one of the great issues of the future, and it will come to be an axiom that insanity, imbecility, hereditary disease, and the like, shall not be increased by breeding. By the latter method education has done much. The slowness and difficulty of the alteration of our fundamental natures serve to emphasize the importance and value of acquired characteristics. Education, in the hands of man, aided by "social inheritance," has made our modern civilization out of barbarism, and gives us hope for the most backward races.—T. D. A. Cockerell, *Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1908.

G. A. S.

The Social Ideal.—The ideal determines the life. If, then, by taking thought, we could project a social ideal upon which the people could agree, one which, because drawn from facts and existing conditions, and the possibilities of human nature, would force its acceptance on every reflective mind, we should have the most effective means of increasing the rapidity of human advancement.

But a social ideal differs from a social forecast. It is a conception of what society ought to be, not of what it is to become. It is ethical. It implies the categorical imperative. It must, therefore, be a work of synthesis, or, if you please, a product of the constructive imagination. What we need now, and what with our wider knowledge we ought to be able approximately to construct, is an ideal scientifically conceived, in harmony with existing facts and forces, and hence possible of attainment. Such an ideal would not be separable and distinct from society as we now find it, but its highest manifestation—society purified and transformed by the best elements it now contains. Social philosophy cannot describe the daily life of the citizen of an ideal world, but it can answer the questions: Is the coming society to be based on the class spirit or on the spirit of brotherhood? Is it to be competitive or co-operative? Is it to be individualistic or socialistic?

Confining ourselves, then, to "the constituent elements of the highest realizable ideal of human life" (*Autobiography of John Stuart Mill*, p. 189), we may

affirm that they are three in number: (1) social intelligence; (2) social economy, and (3) voluntary co-operation.

Social intelligence has been well defined by Henry George, who calls it "that consensus of individual intelligence which forms a public opinion, a public consciousness, and a public will, and is manifested in law, institutions, and administration" (*Social Problems*, p. 9). According to this definition, social intelligence is to be distinguished from the mere sum of individual intelligences. Intelligent men do not necessarily guarantee an intelligent society. In intelligence there is an element of knowledge—no knowledge, no intelligence. Until the people are socially well informed, until they have knowledge of social conditions, know the lessons of social experience, give earnest thought to methods of social improvement, begin to study the requirements of the general good as they study their own, select public representatives with the same care as private agents, no matter how intelligent they are with respect to individual affairs, there will be no high manifestation of social intelligence. This social knowledge and solicitude are at present rare or wanting.

Some social intelligence now exists. It is formed by the operation of natural causes, and without any special attention on the part of society. It comes as an unintended result of social evolution. But the formation of social intelligence is artificial as well as natural. Having arrived at a stage of development at which we realize the importance of a corporate consciousness, we have already begun to devise methods of promoting it. We are beginning to consider the "social aspect" of our various institutions, the "social function" of the school, the home, the church. This must result in an increase of social knowledge, and an enlarged interest in social affairs.

Intelligence is inconsistent with the employment of greater effort than is necessary to attain a given satisfaction. It adapts means to ends. It avoids wastes. Ideal social intelligence therefore implies ideal social economy, and this is the second element of our ideal. Social economy, as well as social intelligence, is initiated by nature and promoted by art. It must manifest itself in social action, and for social action organization is necessary. The social ideal, then, implies thorough social organization for the performance of social tasks. If we conceive society as a unit, we must recognize that as such it has certain needs—protection, sustenance, knowledge, and the like. Supply of these needs, up to a certain point, is necessary to the life and its normal activity. The matter of supplying the general needs of society is properly a social task.

There are four ways in which social organization may be accomplished: (1) By an autocrat: Suppose him to be ideally intelligent and animated by a desire for the public good. So far as the immediate aspect of the situation is concerned, we should then have ideal economy. But at best we should have only a benevolent despot, with no assurance that his successor would be equally wise and benevolent. But still more important, the people would be deprived of one of the best opportunities for self-development, namely, the opportunity afforded by the organization and management of their own affairs. (2) By the state (in the restricted sense, which means the governing class). The same objections obtain here as to the previous method. If benevolent, it is impermanent; and always it deprives the people of the education derived from doing things for themselves. The results are the same—irresponsible power, organization for selfish purposes, paternalism, and undeveloped popular initiative. (3) By private individuals acting in their own interest. The third method is that under which the organization of our industrial activities is now proceeding. A comparatively few men, whom we call captains of industry, own or control the instruments of production and direct our business enterprises for private profit. This is called capitalism. Like both the other methods, it localizes power and leads to the temptation to use this power for selfish ends. Its object is profits, and profits is not synonymous with public good. Its economy is immediate and cannot be perfected, for the reason that perfect social economy is inconsistent with the existence of individual economics looking to private ends. (4) By society itself, where the people themselves take the initiative, organize

themselves and act in the interest of all. This is democracy. In industry it is production for use and not profit.

A third element constituting the ultimate social aim is voluntary co-operation. Social organization implies that men shall work together for the common good, consciously or unconsciously, under compulsion or voluntarily. If men co-operate, either unconsciously or because they are compelled to do so, there is a lack of knowledge and purpose, or a want of interest. In either case there cannot be the highest effectiveness.

The approximate realization of the social ideal would mean a society in which the atrocities of individuals and national strife could no longer take place, because so obviously inconsistent with social intelligence and the spirit of co-operation and brotherhood; a society in which the repressive function of government, as distinguished from the administrative function, will no longer be exercised because no longer necessary, as it is no longer necessary today with the best elements of our population; a society in which the barriers between nation and nation and race and race will be cleared away; and the true patriot will not be he who loves his country, but he who loves his kind; a society in which there will be no poor, except the poor in spirit; no rich, except those who are rich in goodness, wisdom, and love; a society in which there will be no idle, because all will have opportunity for work and all will have learned that the joy of living is in doing; a society in which there will be no broken down and overworked, because a fair distribution of the work of the world will lighten the labor of each; a society which in truth will mean a new heaven and a new earth where man, untrammelled by want and evil conditions, may press rapidly onward in his development and mount to the utmost possibilities of his being.—Ira W. Howarth, in *International Journal of Ethics*, January, 1908.

G. A. S.

The Color Line in the North.—In almost every important city of the north a distinct race problem exists which must, in a few years, assume serious proportions. Though the birth-rate here is less than the death-rate, the negro element is growing more rapidly, perhaps, than any other single element of urban population on account of the influx of immigrants from the South. Race feeling and discrimination are rapidly increasing. Generally speaking, the more negroes the sharper the prejudice. Two classes of colored people come North: the worthless, ignorant, semi-criminal sort; and the hard-working people really seeking better conditions of life. But the negro has not become adjusted to the competitive struggle of the highly developed industrial system of the North, nor has he found the "promised land." On the part of the better class of white men there is an attitude of hesitation and withdrawal. The race riots of the North are as bad as those of the South. Churches even in Boston draw the color line because they must in order to retain their white membership. A few years ago no hotel or restaurant in Boston refused negro guests; now several hotels, restaurants, and confectionary stores will not serve the best of negroes. Human nature north of the Mason and Dixon is no different from human nature south of the line.—R. S. Baker in the *American Magazine*, February, 1908.

L. W.

Some Tendencies in Social Evolution.—At the present time public attention is focused upon political reform. It is a fallacy to believe that legislative enactment in *itself* will effect the necessary improvement in social life. The means are purely artificial. The mere arrangement of society does not completely overcome the individuality of man. The existence of this higher quality in man constitutes a living protest against the suggestion that a far-reaching improvement in physical environment is all that is needed to usher in the millennium. The general improvement of conditions would do much, but more is needed. The age we live in has become disgracefully artificial. Industrial society is wholly artificial. The bane of advancing civilization is ill-regulated material prosperity. Three distinct movements, advancing simultaneously, give some assurance of human progress toward a higher state of life: (1) the movement toward freedom and clearness of thinking; (2) the movement toward

simplicity of life; and (3) the movement which has for its object the improvement of social environment. These tendencies are gaining ground, though rich and poor alike resist change. There has been a revolt against bad government. The people are bent on some large measures of political reform. But reforms travel slowly and deal with influences that are mental, physical, and social, rather than political.—R. G. Davis, *Westminster Review*, January, 1908.
L. W.

The Functions of Charity in Modern Society.—Charity is broader than mere relief-giving and not so inclusive as friendliness or brotherhood. It originated with the clan and has always been based on the principle that the group, in order to have as many efficient members as possible, must help those in need. It is useless to say that it is better to abolish the need for charity than to practice it, for the most perfect social organization could not prevent natural inequalities among men and their consequences. Charity is to accomplish its work in three ways: (1) by adjustment of the socially weak through individual treatment and the improvement of social conditions; (2) care of those who cannot be reclaimed, both because the feeling of social brotherhood demands it and because the degenerate must be segregated; (3) the furthering of social progress, first, by developing social sympathy and, second, by developing a scientific and preventive philanthropy. The social worker then has to deal both with faults in the individual character and with defects in social conditions. In this light, scientific philanthropy becomes largely constructive social reform, where a knowledge of human society, as well as of human nature, is indispensable. Trained experts are not alone sufficient for this work; there must be a general co-operation of public opinion also.—Charles A. Ellwood, *Charities and the Commons*, January 4, 1908.
L. L. B.

The Growth of Large Fortunes.—We have an age of new and striking characteristics. The economic development is both qualitative and quantitative. The causes of the characteristically great fortunes of the age are economic rather than political, their appearance being probably due to the modern developments in technology and industrial organization. In the term riches there are three especial elements of meaning: (1) the possession of wealth or property in a conspicuously large amount, a relative condition significant of great inequality; (2) the yield of a conspicuously large income, not dependent upon labor; (3) large fortunes are a matter of private law; they constitute power pertaining to particular persons. The causes of their growth are impersonal and economic. Individuals are about as they have always been. If unscrupulousness and unfairness have played an unusually large part in the development of large fortunes it is because of the conditions under which the men operate. These conditions are: (1) a shift from more to less democratic forms of property right: The laborer no longer owns his tools, and prices are regulated in the general stock market; (2) a shift to less democratic forms of production and of gainful occupation, both as to technical requirements and as to organization: Power-driven machinery has displaced tools and the regimental organization of factory hands has hindered the all-round development of men; (3) the valuing of all goods in terms of the market on a money basis has given the man familiar with the dynamics of industry a marked advantage for gain.

The tendency of modern wealth is to become productive wealth; only thus under our social system could great fortunes arise. The rich in barbarous times were so in the possession of consumption goods. In the Middle Ages fortunes came from political power. Now they arise as great functioning elements in production. Technical and managerial developments have played a large part in building great fortunes. Large-scale production has everywhere been the rule and consequent, except in agriculture. Consequently only the very wealthy could enter business, unless under the more impersonal guise of corporations. Along with this growth in capital has come a corresponding evolution in ownership forms. The corporation meets the needs of those who wish a sure investment without the risk of managing their own fortunes. It is also a

response to the demand for wider scale production. This form of ownership has been the most fruitful cause of the growth of large fortunes. With increased capital comes also greater economic inequality, especially with removal of obstacles to concentration evidenced in (1) the increasingly greater material for fortunes, (2) the possibility of concentrating riches without increasing the care, and (3) in the ease with which existing fortunes are kept without reference to ability. It requires only a union of ability and energy with initial advantage in means to accumulate the inequality.

This is a development period. Improvements in technique and new forms of operation together with high-pressure exploitation of resources have put a premium upon place, time, and managerial values. The market is become world-wide, and all credit centers in stocks. This is a contributing factor in the growth of wealth in general and consequently in the development of great fortunes in particular. In fact the growth of large fortunes is the natural result of these three factors canvassed: (1) the development of abstract property; (2) the dominance of large-scale production; (3) the differential gain in increase in values.

Concentration of population has accompanied concentration of wealth. Lately, with further economic improvements, the swing has been away from strict concentration. Modern methods of investment, by the diffusion of income from property among the majority, is helping in this decentralizing movement.

The poor are undoubtedly better off than ever before. The question of the adequacy and the tendency of the income of labor is apart from the question of the growth of large fortunes. However, it is probable that the tendency since the industrial revolution is for an increasingly larger proportion of men to become dependent exclusively on labor for a livelihood, while, on the other hand, there has been a corresponding concentration of wealth. There are also favorable counteracting tendencies appearing. Middle- and lower-class opportunities for income are better than formerly, even as regards propertied income.

Society's judgment upon great incomes from property should be from the side of use made of them. This use has often shown public spiritedness. It seems, however, that the social (especially the moral and the political) influence of concentration of riches is on the whole evil. Inequality of natural endowment will ordinarily secure sufficient economic inequality. Present concentration of riches threatens that equality of opportunity and that spirit of individuality and self-reliance, which are essential to democracy. A class with great incomes without labor is more dangerous socially than one administering productive wealth, but the urgent economic and political question is how to restrain the unbridled power of the active rich and their corporations. Governmental interference may be necessary in connection with modern large fortunes.

Work is as yet the tradition and habit of Americans. When recently the son of a multi-millionaire wrote "gentleman" for occupation, the fact was remarked as new and interesting. We have not yet developed a family pride in a non-functioning ancestry, though the seed is germinating. Riches are the only form of secure power in the United States. This is an important cause of development of great fortunes.

It is possible that our development may not continue in the same direction as heretofore. The evolution of abstract property may ultimately cure that high degree of economic inequality of which it has so far been the great cause.—G. P. Watkins, *American Economic Association Publication*, November, 1907.

L. L. B.

The Practical Conditions of the Search for Causes in Historical Work.—

This is an attempt to explain the difference between the point of view of the philosopher and that of the historian, and why the historian cannot define "the precise effect in general terms."

The historian must first seek the cause of the particular event; the determination of that cause is valid only for that particular event. When the historian abstracts from particular conditions of time and place in order to seek

constant successions of phenomena, he leaves history and enters the region of sociology.

In order to describe a particular fact by a general term, it is necessary to analyze the fact so precisely as to reduce it to definite abstract elements; the same name can be given to every other fact that contains exactly the same elements. This is possible in the physical and biological sciences, but in history it is impossible because of the lack of documents previous to the nineteenth century, and because of the nature of such categories of phenomena as the religious and artistic. The use of abstract and general terminology would only conceal the fact that the knowledge is empirical.

To find the particular cause, the historian needs to know: (1) the particular historical facts which have preceded the event; these can be found only in documents; (2) the general relations between human phenomena; this is the region of social science. The insufficiency of materials in these regions makes necessary a study of (3) motives, psychological phenomena. The study of conscious representations enables the historian to know the direction of acts. Though unconscious phenomena are important forces, they cannot be known, and appear to the historian merely as a missing link in the chain of causes.—M. C. Seignobos, "*Les conditions pratiques de la recherche des causes dans le travail historique*," *Bull. de la soc. fr. de phil.*, Vol. VII, p. 263, July, 1907.

E. H. S.

The Coming Generation in France.—The French novelist Marcel Prévost, a sane and shrewd observer, has taken a hand in the discussion of the French nation's future, and has made some suggestions which may prove very significant. The following is translated from a recent article:

Thirty years ago the scene was occupied by a generation that styled itself "decadent." It stooped under the burden of the heavy disasters that had fallen on the country, at the time when the men of that generation were children. Recall the admirable beginning of the *Confessions d'un enfant du siècle* (a book by Alfred de Musset, published in 1836.—TRANSLATOR): "During the wars of the Empire, while the husbands and brothers were in Germany, the anxious mothers had given to the world a pale, serious, nervous generation. . . ."

Alas! the decadent generation came into the world at the moment when the anxious mothers saw Germany at their doors, the brothers and the husbands in the power of the invader. The less energetic of these children were afflicted with a hatred of effort, with a distrust of destiny. The generation as a whole failed of its mission, which was to make armed amends for the defeat of their fathers. And this fact contributed to make them more meditative, more incapable of action, more inclined to take refuge in the subtleties of thought.

We all remember the young men of that time; they were only a few years too old to be my contemporaries. They were distinguished by an extraordinary intellectual culture, by a refined artistic appreciation. They had read everything, at eighteen years, and judged everything. They were serious and disdainful. They had revised for their own behoof all the notions admitted by their elders, and had retained very few of them. They despised muscles, and had little interest in any part of the brain but the circumvolutions which were a trifle abnormal. They preferred a certain philosophy and a certain poetry that were incomprehensible to the normal man. They were studious, and yet the mark of this generation was sterility. Their meager remains have only documentary interest. Those among them whose work has endured are they who rebelled early against the discipline of their school and came back to reality, to life. But the influence of the others has not entirely disappeared. Though shut out from literature, it is still evident in certain reactionary spirits. There is decadence in the divagations of a Hervé, who, a Frenchman, finds nothing undesirable in living under a German yoke.

The young brood that sprawls about, nowadays, on the seashore, in the mountains, and in the fields, seems to be just as clearly defined as the other. As far as I am able to observe, it is a thoroughly different and significant variety. It is not in the slightest degree like the curious generation of the decadents, or like the more amorphous generations that followed.

In the first place a common mark strikes the observer in the most of these young men: they are thoroughly childish. This is absolute truth, and you can verify it easily. The portrait of the precociously serious and melancholy young Frenchman must be laid aside or destroyed. Here is a generation which, at sixteen or eighteen years, has very little desire to ape the man of forty. The boy's chief and almost exclusive interest is physical exercise, sport. At the age when our school companions were eagerly buying mauve, yellow, or green reviews, they buy sporting magazines. The result is, first, that they have a genuinely refreshing air of juvenile good health, and second, that their intellectual culture is sensibly feeble than that of their predecessors. At their age, the contemporaries of Jules Lagorgue had devoured libraries; they had reflected; the indigent erudition of their fathers had excited their compassion. The new brood snap their fingers at erudition. All sincere teachers will tell you that the average of scholarship is dropping lower every year. Let us face the naked fact. It is impossible to be a passionate devotee of football and of metaphysics at sixteen years. The joyous ignorance of these children is profoundly significant.

Their robust health, their suppleness in physical exercises, excite their love, naturally, for movement and consequently for action. They are enterprising and courageous. Having come to the age of reason in the day of automobiles and of wireless telegraphy, no distance terrifies them. The world seems small to them. They think of nothing but rapid and sweeping changes. One can safely prophesy that they will not willingly choose sedentary occupations. It should be foreseen, also, that they will not be so easily satisfied as were their elders with the wages allowed by the state to its functionaries. Sport, which, I insist, is their principal preoccupation, demands leisure and money. Every boy of seventeen years takes for granted nowadays that a life without an auto is a cramped existence.

Delight in movement, then, delight in practical activity, desire to win a fortune; I see all this in the boys of today. The moral effect of these tendencies is, first, that they are not pessimistic. Without formulating a doctrine, the boys believe that life is good. Another moral effect is not less important, but requires more delicate handling. Their physical equilibrium and their need of movement, leaving them little opportunity for thinking, render them more puerile, in every sense of the word. The racket and the bicycle are their women, and women enough for the most of them. In this, as in many other respects, they are like their young neighbors on the other side of the Channel. In a school of South Croydon a friend of mine who was teaching French assured me that the pupils *never* spoke of girls. It is likely to be so with boys absorbed in autos, balls, and bicycles.

Shall we salute with joy this manifest transformation of the young Frenchman, less intellectual and more athletic, less sentimental and more healthy? At the present moment, and in view of the menaces of the future, yes, certainly. Such young men will be better fitted than would aesthetes to solve problems where it is more important to act quickly than to theorize learnedly.

In a country like ours, surcharged with history and saturated with civilization, we must have from time to time a generation that cares more for living than for philosophizing. The important question with regard to this new brood of young cocks is undoubtedly whether they have solid spurs.—Marcel Prévost, "Collégiens en vacances," in *Les annales politiques et littéraires*, August 18, 1907; translated by R. T. House, Weatherford, Okla.